Mörder von Koh Tao gefasst

Da Schinkenstrassen Rolfi möglicht alle Thaksinschen
Propaganda Lügen hier unterbringen will hier meine
Meinung und ein „Neutraler“ Beitrag eines Politik
Professors dazu:

Thaksin hat von Anfang an versucht die Hand
an die CPB Immobilien zu bekommen.
Darum ging es hauptsächlich , die Beteiligungen
waren zur Thaksin Zeit nicht lukrativ.
Sein Hauptargument war dass er sie
„Einträglicher“ machen wollte weil viele
umsonst oder zu niedrigen Pachtraten
verpachtet wurden.
Und hier der Aufsatz dazu:

Thailand’s Recurring Political Conflicts

Thai society has long been known for its relative tolerance, most notably when it comes to socio-political differences. This is in part due to the presence of Buddhism as the national religion and the lack of distinct political ideologies in the majority of Thais. Moreover, the perceived lack of development over the years means that Communist and leftist ideologies have not become a major political force, as has been the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Despite a culture of tolerance and mild socio-political differences, Thailand has been troubled by recurring political conflicts over the last hundred years: the 1932 revolution saw the country moving from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional democracy; democratic governments have been repeated toppled by military coup d’etats in 1947 and 1957; and others ended up in bloodbaths, such as the October 1973 uprising and the “Black May” in 1992. Despite violence and bloodshed, all of these conflicts were resolved by compromise and a general election.

Ideological conflict in the Thai society can be traced back to the conflict between the state and the Communist Party of Thailand and its allies, which began at the end of the World War II. The conflict was marked by a series of confrontations, use of firearms, losses and injuries. This first and most monumental conflict in the Thai society was finally eased thanks to the internal conflict between the leftists themselves and their supporting intellectuals, and a peaceful disarmament measure by the state.

Another conflict that underlines deeper and wider religious and ethnic differences is the problem in the southernmost provinces on the Malaysian border. This conflict has been deeply rooted since the time of British Colonialism. Though it had lessened in violence under compromise negotiations between the Thailand and separatist movement during 1970s-1980s,[1] it came to light once again during the year 2003 when ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was in power, and has only intensified ever since. Despite spending over 80 billion baht in attempt to solve the problem, with approximately 60,000 soldiers stationed in the area to prevent violence, the number of deaths totals over 3000.[2]

As the problems in the deep south continue to haunt the country, Thailand has plunged into a new conflict that stretches deeper and wider into society. The conflict between the anti-Thaksin group and supporters of the ousted premier is not ideological, social or ethnic – and yet it has hit the country harder than any other preceding conflicts.

Thaksin Shinawatra’s Supporters

Supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra – often known as the “Red Shirts” in popular media – have varied in composition over the two different periods. When Thaksin was in power (2001-2006), the key composition of his support group was his family, the politicians of his Thai Rak Thai party, large business conglomerates such as telecommunication companies, finance, and real estate businesses whose rise from the collapse during the 1997 economic crisis relied on help and support from Thaksin and his government.

Thaksin’s family gained unusual wealth during a short period. Pasuk and Baker suggest that Thaksin played ‘Money Politics’ in Thailand, using money and influence to get rid of his competitors.[3] Shortly before the 2006 coup d’etat against him, he sold the Shin Corporation to Singapore’s Temasek Holdings in a 72 billion baht (US$ 1.7 Billion). Aside from his hefty financial power, Thaksin secured his political power through his CEO-management style with Thaksin himself serving as the country’s chief executive, centralizing the Thai public administration system. Top bureaucrats at both national and local level had had meetings with him both at the Prime Minister’s office in Bangkok and by frequent teleconferences. They kept Thaksin’s order as top priority. Key administrative posts such as permanent secretary in ministries with economic influence such as Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Transport and the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board were reshuffled.

Thaksin is the first civil prime minister who exercised control over the military forces by appointing thirty of his classmates[4] from cadet school to key military posts[5] while transferring the then-Army Chief, Gen. Surayud Chulanont to the post of Supreme Commander (which is generally regarded as an inactive military position). This is thought to spring from a conflict in policy regarding relations with Myanmar, where Thaksin was pro-Junta, but Surayud was not.[6] Thaksin also has several friends and loyal supporters in the Royal Thai Police, who he put into key positions in the board of the Government Lottery Office to facilitate the non-budget expenses of his government. Some of his former police subordinates were promoted into special posts overseeing problems in the deep south or into the intelligence unit which had a huge secret budget.[7]

Thaksin Shinawatra’s Popularity

Aside from his control over influential businesses, military and the police, Thaksin’s political power is legitimized by his popularity, as evidenced by his outright victory in three general elections, in 2001, 2005, 2006. The elections in 2007 and 2011 were won by politicians widely regarded as his proxies: in 2007 through Samak Sudaravej of the People’s Power Party (who called himself Thaksin’s nominee), and in 2011, through the Pheu Thai Party and his sister, Yingluck Shinawatra (who Thaksin described as his “clone”).[8] His popularity largely derives from his populist policies, such as the 30-baht health scheme, schemes to assist citizens purchase their first car and home, schemes to ensure that children have access to technology, such as tablets, to support their education,[9] and a scheme providing credit cards to farmers.[10]

After the 2006 coup d’etat, the composition of Thaksin’s support groups changed, as some business groups and state officers distanced themselves from the ousted prime minister, feeling they had been influenced and taken advantage of. Politicians, military leaders and the police continued to serve as his key force in controlling and mobilizing the masses by actively working The United Front For Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD). The UDD, who were politically allied with Thaksin, had functions in finance, orientation, think tank, and propaganda campaigns nationwide. It rose to become the primary organization that worked directly with the masses. More new politicians and local business people emerged while former members of the Communist Party of Thailand helped with mobilizing the masses at the grassroots level, grooming mass leaders within the community through schools in red villages.[11] Community radios were established alongside the use of propaganda and firearms.

The Anti-Thaksin Group

The anti-Thaksin group is centered around its political rival – the Democratic Party. However, the group also includes people who dislike Thaksin for several reasons; from the Sondhi Limthongkul-leader of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), former founder of Palang Dharma party Maj Gen Chamlong Srimuang as well as the elites and business groups who are dissatisfied with Thaksin, including leaders of non-government development organizations and human rights groups who oppose the policy and administration of Thaksin and his cohorts.

The clash between the two groups spans economic, political and ideological conflicts. The turning point of the conflict can be traced back to the 1997 economic crisis during which Thaksin Shinawatra, as deputy prime minister, was believed to have exploited his access to state information regarding the devaluation of Thai baht[12] to the benefit of his own telecommunication business, which was perceived to have suffered relatively little in the crisis. His victory during the 2001 election was followed by his imposing measures and barriers to his business rivals, including an attempt to take over Prachai Leophai-ratana’s Thai Petrochemical Industry (TPI) (the now-bankrupted largest petrochemical company in Southeast Asia), and preventing Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi’s Thai Beverage company, considered the largest alcohol business in Thailand, from launching its initial public offering in the Thai Stock Exchange.[13]

The economic crisis created a monumental economic conflict between the between the Thaksin camp, who benefited from the economic crisis, and his rivals, through the huge losses of Siam Cement Pcl. following the devaluation of baht. Both SCG and the Siam Commercial Bank form the financial backbone of the Crown Property Bureau. According to a study by Porphan Ouyyanont, both companies failed to pay dividends between the year 1997-2002,[14] and another study by E Ellis states that the Crown Property Bureau lost 75% of its income during the crisis and needed to resort to loans to fund the rural expenses.[15]

Aside from the economic competition, both conflicting groups strive for acceptance by the people. Thaksin and his proxy parties’ victory in five elections since 2001 is a testament of his being the most popular civilian prime minister to date. The anti-Thaksin, Democratic Party has suffered from repeated losses in elections.

Violence and Intolerance

This new political conflict has been ongoing for over 10 years, but the signs of violence first erupted during the rally of the UDD from April 2009 to May 2010, using firearms such as AGA guns, grenades, and M79 grenade launchers. An unidentifiable force known publicly as the ”men in black” came into the picture, fighting mostly against the military, resulting in a total of over 100 deaths of civilians and over 1000 military officers injured. And a new wave of conflicts erupted in November 2013 when the lower house, with Pheu Thai MPs comprising the majority, passed the amnesty bill that would benefit Thaksin’s return.

The passing of this controversial amnesty bill led to a new congregation of both the anti-Thaksin camp and his supporters, with the conflict manifesting itself in new forms, from using the masses to pressure the powers-that-be, to advertisements and mass mobilization. One certain difference, however, is the fact that this new conflict of division stretches far deeper into the village and family levels, spreading throughout the country with each side claiming its rights and legitimacy in overthrowing the other, refusing to follow the rule of law and denying the rights of the other, leaving the country with little chance to see the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel.

[1] Thanet Aphornsuvan, Nation-State and the Muslim Identity in the Southern Unrest and Violence” In Understanding Conflict and Approching Peace in Southern Thailand, ed. Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt, Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006, pp.92-127; Patrick Jory, ed., Ghost of the Past in Southern Thailand, Singapore : National University of Singapore, 2013; Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land : Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand, New York : Cornell University Press, 2008, Introduction

[2] Ukrist Pathmanand, “Thaksin’s Achilles’ Heel : The Failure of Hawkish Approaches in the Thai South” Critical Asian Studies, 38:1 2006, 073-093

[3] Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin, second edition (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 195-196 , 289-290

[4] Thaksin was a member of Class 10 in pre-cadet school. Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratklin who was considered responsible for the 2006 coup was of Class 7. It was new political conflict among many factions within pre cadet school, but highly intensified since Thaksin was Prime Minister: see Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen : Institute of Asian Studies, 2005) Chapter 4

[5] McCargo ibid, pp. 140-150 Kevin Hewison, “ A Book, The King and The 2006 Coup” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38:1 (2008) pp. 192-205

[6] McCargo and Ukrist, p. 150.

[7] McCargo and Ukrist, pp 230-233.

[8] Thailand: Thaksin Picks Sister for Prime Minister Race – TIME http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2072553,00.html#ixzz2tqWZUE25

[9] http://www.thaigov.go.th/en/news-room/item/71389-one-tablet-pc-per-child-education-for-all.html (access 20 February 2014)

[10] http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/239306/agricultural-policy-platforms (access 20 February 2014)

[11] Apichat Satitniramai, Yukti Mukdawijitra and Niti Pawakapan, Re-examining the Political Landscape of Thailand, Thai Health Promotion Foundation, 2013.

[12] Thaksin Shinawatra served as deputy prime minister during Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyut’s government in mid-1996-1997.

[13] The persons accused of obstructing the listing of Thai Beverage in the Thai Stock Exchange are Thaksin’s close aides; Dr Thanong Pitaya who was the finance minister and chairman of SET, and Anant Asavabhikhin, Chairman of Land and House Pcl and director of SET. Quote from The Nation 10 January 2006 and Ukrist Pathmanand, “ A Different Coup E tat ?” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38 : 1 2008, 134-135

[14] Porphan Ouyyanont (2008) “The Crown Property Bureau in Thailand and the Crisis of 1997” Journal Of Contemporary Asia 38: 1 :,175-176.

[15] Ellis, E (2003) “ Royal Rehap : Thailand’s Crown Property Bureau Gets a Corporate Makeover”, Fortune, 10 July, http : //www.ericellis.com/cpb.htm (downloaded 30 April 2007).
About The Author (Ukrist Pathmanand):

Ukrist Pathmanand is Research Professor of Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. He has contributed to Far Eastern Economic Review, Critical Asian Studies, Journal of Contemporary Asia and Bangkok Post. His main focus is regional political economy development, democratization and International Relations.

hanseat: Du schreibst so, als hätte Militärputsch Nr. 1 den heutigen Monarchen die absolutistische Regierungsform entwendet, derweil du doch schreibst: „..Davon wurde ihm nach dem Putsch, der zu seiner Entmachtung führte..“! Vielleicht überdenkst du noch einmal deine Zeilen?

Moin Hanseat,

Wenn dir in der Hauptsache die Argumente fehlen, wirst du gleich wieder zum „Erbsenzähler“ in Nebensächlichkeiten und machst zwecks Ablenkung dann jede nur greifbare Ablenkungs-Mücke zum Elefanten.

Ob zwischen Bhumipol und dem vor 1932 noch absolutistisch regierenden Rama noch der Bruder König war, spielt doch in Bezug auf das Wesentliche, nämlich der für beide gültigen Entmachtung zu nur noch konstitutionellen Regenten überhaupt keine Rolle.

Konzentriere dich also ruhig wieder auf das in Bezug auf die von dir angezweifelte Forbes-Reichtums- Rangliste wichtigere Thema, nämlich den seit 1948 von regierenden Royalisten (..den „Demokraten“ ) wieder durchgeboxten Exclusiv-Zugriff des aktuell regierenden Königs auf das ins CPB ausgelagerte sogenannte Kronvermögen.

Wenn du vielleicht meinst, dass diese von Royalisten bewirkte Änderung zu Gunsten des Herrschers nur erfolgt sei, weil der König als fähigerer Bürokrat eingeschätzt wurde als die vergleichsweise unfähigen Finanzbeamten 😉 ..oder damit er als ehrenamtlicher Vermögenswerte-„Kontrolleur“ eine vor Alzheimer schützende geistige Betätigung erhalten sollte , bist du nach meiner Meinung naiv und total auf dem Holzweg..

Wenn du mich z.B. überzeugen willst, dass die Einnahmen aus dem vom PCB gemanagten „Kronvermögen“ nicht dem König, sondern unter Finanzamtskontrolle der thailändischen Staatskasse zugeführt werden, dann solltest du mal versuchen, einen entsprechenden Posten im thailändischen Haushaltsplan zu entdecken.

Die jährlich Erträge von über 10 Milliarden Baht müsstest du dann unter „Einnahmen“ finden mit der Bezeichnung „Erträge aus Vermögenswerten der Krone, Einzugsstelle CPB“ oder so ähnlich.
Einen Grund, die erfreulichen Zahlen im Haushaltsplan zu verbergen, dürfte es nicht geben.
Mein „Geheimtipp“ dazu ist jedoch, dass du nichts davon finden wirst, denn was nicht in den Staatshaushalt wandert, kann dort auch nicht als Einnahme ausgewiesen werden.. 😉

Aber macht ja nichts, denn es wird schließlich alles vom König exclusiv „kontrolliert“.. bzw. vereinnahmt und guten Zwecken zum Wohle der Untertanen zugeführt. Leider scheint es auch dabei über die vom König konkret eingesetzten Mittel keine überprüfbaren Zahlenwerke zu geben.

So bleibt es dann schleierhaft bzw. für dich, also einen Hanseaten 😉 frei auslegbar, für welche Projekte der König nur die ihn finanziell nicht belastende „Schirmherrschaft“ übernommen hat und für welche tatsächlich Kapital in nicht veröffentlichter Höhe aus den königlichen Einkünften eingesetzt worden ist.

  Rolf46(Quote)  (Reply)

Rolf46: Sachen die zum Himmel stinken, haben in Thailand ..ebenso wie die regelmäßig stattfindenden Militärcoups.. doch schon eine sehr lange Tradition und kommen sogar in besten Familien vor..

http://www.nrhz.de/flyer/beitrag.php?id=18871

Endlich outet sich unser Schinkenstrassen Rolfi der mit Thailand
nix im Sinn hat als Hinterbliebener des ST.de
Wenn er uns jetzt noch einen seiner dortigen Nicks
nennen würde, wüssten wir wenigstens mit wem wir
eszu tun haben!
Was tut man nicht Alles um den Grossbetrüger Thaksin Shinawatra
zu verteidigen!
„Mark Teufel“ hat 12 Bücher dazu geschrieben und die
gesamte Thai Geschichte umgedichtet!
Lesen wollte den Mist nur keiner!

  berndgrimm(Quote)  (Reply)

Die 3 burmesischen Arbeiter waren ganz sicher die wirklichen Täter, da sie ihr Verbrechen bei der Unterhaltung auf der Polizeistation zugegeben und auch unterschrieben haben.

Die Polizei wusste schon von Anfang an, wer die Täter sind, aber die wollten ganz sicher gehen.

Dass alles 100%ig korrekt ist, ist schon daran zu erkennen, dass nur 24 Stunden vor der Ermittlung der burmesischen Täter der 37 jährige Thailänder Pornprasit Sukdam auf der Polizeistation misshandelt wurde, weil er nicht bereit war, als korrupter Zeuge in diesem Fall aufzutreten.

Schaut mal hier:

http://www.thailand-tip.com/nachrichten/news/polizei-verpruegelt-einen-mann-und-zwingt-ihn-als-zeuge-im-ko-tao-mordfall-auszusagen/

Da fragt man sich doch, warum händeringend versucht wird, Zeugen zu korruptieren, wenn doch alles so klar ist???

Tatsache ist, dass gar nichts klar war oder ist und die gesamte Story mit den burmesischen Tätern an den Haaren herbei gezogen wurde.

Ich persönlich habe noch nicht einen einzigen Ausländer kennen gelernt oder in den Kommentaren gelesen, der tatsächlich glaubt, die Polizei hat „gute“ Arbeit geleistet und die burmesischen Arbeiter wären keine Sündenbock sondern die wirklichen Täter.

Alle sagten oder schrieben, das die Sache zum Himmel stinkt!!!

Nur unser STIN nicht, der glaubt immer noch an diese verlogenen initiierte „Ermittlungsarbeit.“

Gruß Sepp